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The Unbearable Lightness* of 
Consent in Contract Law 
Chunlin Leonhard † 
Abstract 
The consent concept has enjoyed a dominant position in contract 
law. Scholars have described it as “the master concept that defines 
the law of contracts in the United States.”1 That makes intuitive 
sense. Contracts are private agreements—a set of terms and 
conditions to which the parties have consented. Some have pointed 
out that the consent doctrine helps promote individual autonomy and 
freedom of contract, core values protected by contract law. Consent 
has served to legitimize and justify the government’s choice of sides in 
a contractual relationship. 
This Article queries whether consent alone is sufficient to justify 
the government’s choice of sides in a private contractual relationship. 
This Article contributes to the current scholarly discussion on the 
problematic aspects of consent and proposes an alternative way to 
evaluate when a court should use its coercive power to enforce a 
contract. This Article proposes that contract law abandon its consent-
centric focus. The elasticity of the concept and its easy manipulability 
render it an improper basis for state intervention. Instead, courts 
should adopt a totality of circumstances standard to determine 
whether government should exercise its coercive power to favor one 
contractual party over the other. 
 
* I thank Professor Steve Ramirez of Loyola University Chicago School of 
Law for the title inspired by Milan Kundera’s book, The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being. Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of 
Being (Michael Henry Heim trans., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
20th anniversary ed. 2004) (1984). In that book, Kundera explored the 
concept of “lightness.” He described the insignificance of life as “light.” 
As discussed in this Article, the consent concept, despite the ideal 
imbued in it and the beauty of its appeal, is ultimately too “light” as 
the justification for the government’s choice of sides in a private 
contractual relationship. 
† Chunlin Leonhard is an Associate Professor at Loyola University New 
Orleans College of Law. I thank my colleagues at Loyola University New 
Orleans College of Law for their support and their comments on the 
earlier drafts of this Article. I also benefitted from comments by 
participants in the 2011 CAPALF/NEPOC hosted by Hofstra 
University School of Law between November 3 and 5, 2011. I thank my 
research assistant Tina Campbell for her diligent help with this Article.  
1. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 Yale L.J. 899, 900 
(1994).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law 
58 
Contents 
Introduction .................................................................................................... 58 
I. Understanding Consent ....................................................................... 64 
A. The Appeal of Consent .......................................................................... 64 
B. The Meaning of Consent ....................................................................... 67 
II. Consent and Contract Law ............................................................... 70 
A. Consent and Contract Formation ......................................................... 70 
B. Consent and Contract Defenses ............................................................ 73 
C. Consent and Contract Interpretation .................................................... 75 
D. Current Contract Law’s Enforcement of Contract Under Consent ....... 76 
III. Problems with Contract Law’s Consent Focus ........................... 77 
A. The Motivational Complexity of Consent .............................................. 78 
B. Marketplace Manipulation of Consent ................................................... 79 
C. The Growing Disconnect Between Consent and Commercial 
Contract Practices ............................................................................... 81 
D. Insufficiency of Current Contract Defenses .......................................... 82 
E. Consent and Contract Law Goals ......................................................... 84 
IV. Alternative to a Consent-Focused Approach .............................. 85 
A. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test in Other Contexts .................. 86 
B. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test for Contract Enforcement ...... 89 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 90 
 
Introduction 
“We use consent theory not as a map, not realizing that like 
any other map it’s simpler than reality, but as a set of blinders 
or rose-colored glasses that make the world look clearer, less 
problematic, than it really is.” 2 
The consent concept3 has enjoyed a dominant position in contract 
law.4 Scholars have described it as “the master concept that defines 
 
2. Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 247 
(1989). 
3. Many scholarly discussions of consent seem to conflate consent as an act 
with consent as the central concept of a consent theory. The consent 
theory portrays society as consisting of free, independent individuals who 
control their own destiny and who are free to make their own choices. Id. 
at 1. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the relationship be-
tween consent as an act and its role as a central concept of consent 
theory. This Article focuses on consent as used in contract law. The 
consent concept has been used or relied upon in different areas of law. It 
has contributed to the discussion of the reasonableness of police searches. 
See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–08 (2002) (deter-
mining that a police search was reasonable when conducted after the 
officers had approached the defendants on a bus and the defendants had 
consented); see also Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary”, but Still Reasonable: 
A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 
Ind. L.J. 773 (2005) (discussing the consent doctrine in the context of 
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the law of contracts in the United States.”5 That makes intuitive 
sense. Contracts are private agreements—a set of terms and condi-
tions to which the parties have consented.6 Some have pointed out 
that the consent doctrine helps promote individual autonomy and 
freedom of contract, core values to which contract law is committed.7 
After all, individual autonomy and freedom would not mean much if an 
individual’s consent did not matter. Consent has morally justified and 
legitimized government intervention in private contractual relationships.8  
This Article does not question the role of consent as the basis for 
 
warrantless police searches). It has relieved some forms of criminal 
liability, for example through the consent defense in rape cases. See, e.g., 
People v. Khan, 264 N.W.2d 360, 366 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) 
(“Although the [Michigan rape] statute is silent on the defense of consent, 
. . . it impliedly comprehends that a willing, noncoerced act of sexual 
intimacy or intercourse between persons of sufficient age . . . is not 
criminal sexual conduct.”). It has shielded some from civil liability, and 
imposed civil liability on some others. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Graduated 
Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of Justification, 61 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 17, 19–20, 23 (2010) (discussing the consent 
defense to medical malpractice liability, as embedded in the tort law de-
fense of assumption of risk, and consent as the basis for contract liability).  
4. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. 
Rev. 269, 270 (1986) (proposing that “[a] consent theory of contract 
explains why we generally take an ‘objective’ approach to contractual 
intent and why we deviate from this approach in some situations” and 
that “[c]onsent is the moral component that distinguishes valid from 
invalid transfers of alienable rights”); see also Menachem Mautner, 
Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What is so Problematic in the 
Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law? 3 Theoretical 
Inquiries L. 545, 551 (2002) (indicating that an objective “reasonable 
person” approach to contracts “evolved into one of the most entrenched 
dogmas of contract law”). 
5. Schuck, supra note 1, at 900; see also Bell, supra note 3, at 36 
(providing examples indicating the importance of consent to contract 
law). 
6. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 
94 Yale L.J. 997, 1010 (1985) (discussing the notion that contracts are 
“private” and controlled by the parties). 
7. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract 
8–9 (1993) (examining the political justification for “private ordering”); 
Peter A. Alces, Contract Reconceived, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 39, 42 (2001) 
(explaining that consent is “vindicated by . . . individual autonomy”); 
Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in 
the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 
Harv. L. Rev. 384, 384 (1985) (discussing commitment to individual 
autonomy). 
8. Barnett, supra note 4, at 304–05.  
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a moral obligation to keep one’s promise.9 It queries whether the 
government should primarily rely on consent to justify its decision to 
side with one private party over another. Contract law’s consent focus 
is increasingly problematic due to multiple factors. To begin with, 
consent is an amorphous, difficult-to-define concept that is made in-
creasingly more difficult by the marketplace manipulations of human 
decision making biases.10 Is it consent simply because someone signed 
an agreement? Is it consent if a person signed an agreement without 
having all the information or without understanding the available 
information? Is it consent if someone signed an agreement, but 
unbeknownst to her, the agreement was carefully designed to induce 
her to sign the agreement?11 
With the advent of the “age of persuasion,”12 defining consent and 
ascertaining its existence have become even more difficult, if not 
 
9. This Article also does not participate in a debate about the importance 
or necessity of consent to legitimate government. For an interesting 
discussion on this topic see Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 753 (2000). This Article merely questions contract 
law’s reliance on consent as a justification for contract enforcement.  
10. See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding 
Commitment, 75 Ind. L.J. 1125, 1125 (2000) (pointing out that consent 
is a “fuzzy and contested” concept). One could argue that the problem 
with consent is not a matter of definition, but rather an issue about 
what standard to use to ascertain its existence. The meaning of consent 
is practically limited by the standards used to ascertain its existence. 
For example, if one adopts the objective standard to ascertain whether a 
party has consented by looking at the outward manifestation of consent, 
the consent as ascertained would mean apparent consent without regard 
to whether truly voluntary consent existed. On the other hand, if one 
defines consent as voluntarily arising out of one’s free will, the objective 
standard is not up to the task of ascertaining the existence of consent as 
defined. This Article treats the problem related to consent both as an 
issue of definition and standard. Part of the problem with the concept is 
defining how voluntary consent must be in order to qualify as consent 
that pays tribute to the core values of contract law—individual 
autonomy and freedom of contract. See Trebilcock, supra note 7, at 
127 (“From an autonomy perspective, where choices are made on the 
basis of critically defective information, at some point such choices 
presumably cease to satisfy the conditions for an autonomous choice.”). 
11. See, e.g., Silver v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 
1330, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (examining a situation where a plaintiff 
alleged that a lender “engaged in ‘bait and switch’ tactics whereby [the 
lender] induced her into applying for a mortgage with promises of low 
interest rates, low monthly payments and a fixed interest rate, but then 
changed the terms of the mortgage at closing”). 
12. I borrowed the phrase from the title of a book written by Terry O’Reilly 
and Mike Tennant. Terry O’Reilly & Mike Tennant, The Age of 
Persuasion (2009). O’Reilly and Tennant also created “The Age of 
Persuasion” radio show, broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation and Sirius Radio. 
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impossible. Behavioral studies during the last few decades have 
provided a more in-depth understanding of human decision-making 
processes, including predictable biases.13 Relying on those insights, 
powerful commercial forces have deliberately manipulated people’s 
decisions.14 Those unprecedented marketplace phenomena have raised 
some thorny issues for contract law. These days, voluntary consent 
may not exist even when all of the traditional indicia of consent exist. 
People could have signed an agreement and intended to enter into 
certain transactions and yet there might not be actual “consent.” An 
outward manifestation of consent does not necessarily equal the 
knowledge required for meaningful consent.  
An example of such marketplace manipulation is the subprime 
mortgage transactions that caused the current financial crisis. Studies 
showed that lenders deliberately designed mortgage products so that 
they appeared more affordable to borrowers than they actually were.15 
When the borrowers signed the mortgage agreements, does their 
“consent” justify the government’s choice to side with the lenders? 
Courts have generally answered the question affirmatively in the 
litigation arising out of subprime mortgage crisis.16 
 
13. See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 8–10 (2011) 
(tracing the studies that Kahneman and his colleagues conducted since 
the 1970s that eventually uncovered many human decision biases that 
undermine the generally accepted notion that human beings are rational). 
14. A Federal Trade Commission study found that fourty-four reporting 
companies in 2006 spent a total of $9.6 billion to market food and 
beverages. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Marketing Food to Children 
and Adolescents: A Review of Industry Expenditures, 
Activities, and Self-Regulation ES-2 (2008), available at 
http://ftc.gov/os/2008/07/P064504foodmktingreport.pdf. When a per-
son reaches for a can of Coke, how much of that decision is made by the 
person? How much of that decision is attributed to the unrelenting TV 
commercials promoting Coke products the person has seen? See Oren 
Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage 
Contracts, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1073, 1079–80 (2009) (arguing that the 
subprime mortgage crisis was caused by lenders pushing “risky credit 
onto borrowers who were incapable of repaying” because the borrowers 
had “imperfect rationality”); Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 
L. & Inequality 135, 158–160 (2009) (pointing out that the marketing 
industry spend billions of dollars on behavioral research to devise 
marketing strategies which can increase sales). 
15. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 14, at 1080 (“[L]enders willingly catered 
to borrowers’ imperfectly rational demand even when the demanded 
product designs increased the default risk borne by lenders.”).  
16. See, e.g., Silver, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 1334 (granting defendants’ summary 
judgment motion on all of plaintiff borrower’s claims including 
contractual claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also Caraang v. PNC 
Mortg., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Haw. 2011) (dismissing plaintiff 
borrowers’ claim for breach of the duty of good faith because a party 
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Because of the ease with which “consent” can be manipulated, 
contract law’s consent focus will inevitably lead the courts to use the 
coercive power of the state to favor the more powerful party in an eco-
nomic relationship.17 The party with more bargaining power, resources, 
and better access to information is in a better position to manipulate.  
Some scholars have identified the problems with contract law’s 
commitment to consent.18 Some have identified defects related to 
consent in the area of standard form contracts19 and cyberspace 
contracts.20 Professor Radin, in her article Humans, Computers and  
cannot breach a covenant of good faith and fair dealing before a 
contract is formed); Finuliar v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P, No.  
C-11-02629 JCS, 2011 WL 4405659 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2011) (dismiss-
ing the plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing because plaintiff failed to identify a specific contractual 
provision as a basis for the claim); Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
No. C-11-02279 JCS, 2011 WL 3809808 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) (dis-
missing the borrowers’ contract claims because the plaintiffs failed to 
identify any specific contractual provisions that were breached or 
frustrated); Heaton v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 10-12394, 2011 WL 
3112325 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff claim because 
the plaintiff alleged nothing more than an ordinary business relationship 
between the plaintiff and defendant); Park v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 
No. 10CV1547-WQH-RBB, 2011 WL 98408 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011) 
(dismissing all of the plaintiff borrowers’ claims including claims for 
breach of good faith and fair dealing and unconscionability because the 
complaint failed to sufficiently allege terms of contract to which the 
covenant could attach). It is not hard to imagine that some borrowers 
did not even assert any contractual claims, probably recognizing the 
futility of attempting such a claim under contract law.  
17. “Enforcement, in fact, puts the machinery of the law in the service of 
one party against the other. When that is worthwhile and how that 
should be done are important questions of public policy.” Morris R. 
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 562 (1933). 
18. See, e.g., Trebilcock, supra note 7, at 126 (pointing out that “it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to resolve most problems of information 
asymmetry within the framework of an internal theory of contract 
premised on consensually assumed obligations”); see also Peter A. Alces, 
Guerrilla Terms, 56 Emory L.J. 1511, 1514 (2007) (discussing issues 
raised by the reality of standard form contracts and finding it 
“appropriate to question the role and operation of doctrine that has 
strayed too far from the substantial, real bargain and agreement, to the 
insubstantial, indeed aleatory, inference of consent”); Radin, supra note 
10, at 1125–28 (questioning contract law’s commitment to consent in the 
face of commercial computer-contracting practices); West, supra note 7, 
at 428 (arguing that “consent itself” does not best promote autonomy). 
19. See, e.g., Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for 
Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for 
Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 Seattle U. L. Rev. 469, 500–
02 (2008) (discussing how the “rolling contract theory” is defective when 
weighed against more modern approaches to contract theory).  
20. Radin, supra note 10, at 1128–29. 
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Binding Commitments, raised some thoughtful questions about the 
consent-based approach.21 She examined commercial practices in 
online computer contracting and queried whether “the move online 
exacerbate[s] the disjuncture between the consent-based picture and 
the reality of transactions.”22  
So far, contract law has addressed the defects related to consent 
through a patchwork of contract defenses and doctrines such as 
unconscionability.23 Courts’ analyses of contract law issues have 
generally not deviated from the consent-centric approach.24 Continued 
reliance on consent will lead to a deeper disconnect between contract 
law and marketplace realities.25 This Article suggests an alternative 
approach that attempts to untether the contract law analysis from the 
traditional consent focus.26  
To provide a context for the discussion, Part I of this Article draws 
on the findings of behavioral studies to explain why our society seems 
to be so enthralled by the consent concept. It also attempts to clarify 
the meaning of consent. Part II examines contract law doctrines 
designed to ascertain the existence of consent and those doctrines’ 
limitations. Part III of the Article identifies some problems with relying 
on the consent doctrine as a lynchpin for enforcement. Finally, Part IV 
 
21. Id. at 1125. 
22. Id. at 1126. 
23. See infra Part III.D. 
24. See cases cited supra note 16. 
25. As this Article is being drafted, the Occupy Wall Street Movement is 
spreading throughout different cities in the United States. The 
organization’s website describes itself as a “leaderless resistance 
movement with people of many colors, genders and political persuasions. 
The one thing we all have in common is that We Are The 99% that will 
no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%. We are using the 
revolutionary Arab Spring tactic to achieve our ends and encourage the 
use of nonviolence to maximize the safety of all participants.” Occupy 
Wall Street, http://occupywallst.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
26. This proposal reflects not a dislike of the consent concept or all the ideals 
associated with it, but rather a realization of the difficulty, if not the 
impossibility, of determining the existence of consent. The elasticity of the 
concept and its easy manipulability renders it an improper basis for state 
intervention. This Article does not argue that an individual’s consent should 
not matter. Indeed, in an ideal world, if an individual’s consent is a result of 
equal bargaining power with equal access to information and full 
comprehension and adequate tools exist to ascertain its existence, an 
individual’s consent would be adequate to justify government enforcement 
of the promise. The problem is that we do not live in an ideal world: the 
appearance of consent can be easily manipulated and powerful commercial 
forces are manipulating human decision making biases to achieve the 
appearance of consent. The consent-focused inquiry distracts courts from 
more important considerations of fairness.  
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of this Article proposes that courts apply a totality of circumstances 
standard to determine on whose behalf the government should exercise 
its coercive power in a contractual relationship.  
I. Understanding Consent 
Why are we so enthralled by the consent concept? What explains its 
iconic status in contract law? What exactly does consent mean? What 
kind of consent reflects the core values of individual autonomy and 
freedom of contract? This Part offers some thoughts on these questions.  
A. The Appeal of Consent 
The consent concept has strong emotional appeal in our society 
because we as a society pride ourselves on individual autonomy and 
freedom.27 The concept belongs to the basket of core ideas that 
underlie the American Dream.28 The central idea of the American 
Dream is that we are in control of our own destiny. It has been 
described as “the creed of the rugged individualist—a belief that 
anyone who works hard can succeed. . . . As free agents in a free 
society, we would all have equal access to economic opportunity.”29  
The consent concept is thus consonant with the ideal image that 
we would like to have. 30 It gives us a comforting narrative about 
ourselves. Humans have a strong need for coherence.31 We are free and 
 
27. See Herzog, supra note 2, at 215 (clarifying that the author is not 
arguing that “consent theory has outlived its usefulness” because we are 
“still in large part a world of masterless men”); Bell, supra note 3, at 29 
(using human autonomy to argue that “aretaic moral philosophies 
should value consent as a necessary constituent of human flourishing”).  
28. See Rick Steves, A United Europe in the 21st Century: Eclipsing the 
American Dream?, Rick Steves’ Eur., http://www.ricksteves.com/ 
about/pressroom/activism/eurodream.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) 
(claiming that“[t]he American Dream emphasizes autonomy, national 
pride, and material wealth”). Pop literature also promotes the message 
that the individual alone is responsible for his or her own fate. See 
Barbara Ehrenreich, Bait and Switch 81 (2005) (quoting from a 
“pop-psych fad” book and indicating that “[i]t’s a long-standing American 
idea . . . that circumstances count for nothing compared to the power of 
the individual will”).  
29. Steves, supra note 28. 
30. Upon this concept was born an entire consent theory. Don Herzog 
described this “familiar figure” that “haunts modern society” as “the 
free agent, bound only by his own choices. He chooses a career, a 
spouse, a religion, a lifestyle, and more. He animates our moral and 
political arguments, our very idea of what a person is, and our social 
lives.” Herzog, supra note 2, at ix. 
31. Nobel Prize–winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman wrote extensively 
about the human need for coherence in his recent book, Thinking, Fast 
and Slow. Kahneman, supra note 13, at 79–88. 
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independent and we control our own destiny.32 We are free to agree or 
not to agree, to consent or not to consent because we alone can define 
our relationships with others.33 Respect for consent means respect for 
our individualism and autonomy.34  
Contract law naturally embraces the consent concept as the 
lynchpin for enforcement of promises. This is an easy story to tell 
and sell.35 Indeed, one could argue that the danger of the consent 
concept (and its ability to do mischief) lies in its strong appeal and 
coherence. Because of its appeal, there is no ready constituent to 
expose its potential to do mischief. There is little political will to 
save people from themselves.  
The alternative narrative, which unfortunately more closely 
resembles reality, is a more difficult story, as behavioral economists 
have shown.36 We are not really free.37 We have multiple obligations 
to family, friends, superiors, and various affiliated groups.38 Our 
 
32. See Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimenta-
tion and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 Cath. Law. 455, 461 (1996) 
(“Both the legitimating and justifying faces of consent purportedly 
embody and advance notions of freedom and autonomy.”). Some have 
pointed out that the concept of consent and the related concept of 
individualism have contributed to the success of this country. It 
motivated people to do their best because of a strong belief in 
themselves. Steves, supra note 28. While the consent concept can do 
good, we need to be mindful of its ability to do harm when used as a 
basis for government intervention.  
33. Schuck, supra note 1, at 900–01. 
34. Garnett, supra note 32, at 489. 
35. This message is repeated in many popular literature and self-help books. 
E.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 28, at 81–82. The consent concept is also 
consistent with America’s historical distrust of government and provides 
a ready justification for keeping the government out of people’s private 
economic relationships. See Daniel B. Klein, 3 Libertarian Essays 
30 (1998) (“Where people distrust government, they choose politically to 
have much liberty . . . .”). 
36. See Kahneman, supra note 13, at 128 (pointing out that human 
decision-making biases, such as priming effect, “threaten the subjective 
sense of agency and autonomy”). 
37. See Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational 321 (First Harper 
Perennial ed. 2010) (“[W]e are pawns in a game whose forces we largely 
fail to comprehend. We usually think of ourselves as sitting in the 
driver’s seat, with ultimate control over the decisions we make and the 
direction our life takes; but, alas, this perception has more to do with 
our desires—with how we want to view ourselves—than with reality.”). 
38. See Garnett, supra note 32, at 509 (“We are not simply ‘choosers,’ as 
the ethic of autonomy and consent posits. We are members, friends, and 
loved ones as well.”). 
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choices can be easily swayed.39 We often make decisions not based on 
best evidence and we are distracted by secondary considerations.40 
Our flaws are so predictable that we can be easily manipulated.41 
When we agree to do certain things, it may be due to multiple 
reasons that may not reflect our free will.42 Our decisions may reflect 
our environment and other external factors.43 In reality, we make very 
few decisions free of outside influences.44 
Faced with the ideal and the real, we embrace the ideal whole-
heartedly. Indeed any challenge to the consent doctrine could risk being 
viewed as advocating for irresponsible behavior. How can anyone argue 
that someone should not be held accountable for what they have agreed 
to do‽45 The consent concept is in essence part of our identity.  
 
39. See Kahneman, supra note 13, at 140 (describing psychologist Paul 
Slovic’s work, which shows that human judgment is guided more by 
emotions than reasons and is easily influenced by multiple factors). 
40. See id. at 128 (describing the influence of priming effects, “in which 
your thoughts and behavior may be influenced by stimuli to which you 
pay no attention at all, and even by stimuli of which you are completely 
unaware”). Studies have shown that people do not necessarily act to 
maximize their economic interests. See Michael Shermer, The Mind 
of the Market 176 (2008) (“[E]xtremely low ultimatum game offers 
are usually rejected—we are willing to forgo gain in order to prevent 
another from receiving an unjust award. That is, we’ll pay to punish 
fair-trade transgressors.”); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1492 (1998) (“People 
will often behave in accordance with fairness considerations even when 
it is against their financial self-interest and no one will know.”). 
41. See Ariely, supra note 37, at 317 (“[W]e are all far less rational in our 
decision making than standard economic theory assumes. Our irrational 
behaviors are neither random nor senseless—they are systematic and 
predictable."). 
42. See Kahneman, supra note 13, at 128 (“[O]ur thoughts and our 
behavior are influenced, much more than we know or want, by the 
environment of the moment”). 
43. For example, Professor West pointed out that the characters portrayed 
in Kafka’s world seem to better resemble human reality than the 
rational being portrayed in Professor Posner’s world. See West, supra 
note 7, at 427 (“Our subjective experiences of the consensual 
transactions we enter do not accord with Posner’s external descriptions 
of those transactions.”). 
44. See Kahneman, supra note 13, at 119–28 (discussing the anchoring 
effect’s influence on choices); id. at 129–35 (discussing studies that show 
how people’s decisions are affected by availability bias). 
45. I cannot help but be a little defensive myself. This Article does not argue 
that people should not be held accountable. Instead, this Article advocates 
for an alternative basis to hold people accountable when the coercive 
power of the state is invoked. When people’s “consent” no longer reflects 
their free will, something more than “consent” is necessary to justify the 
state’s use of coercive power in favor of one party. 
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B. The Meaning of Consent 
What does consent mean? Webster’s II New College Dictionary 
defines consent when used as a noun as “[v]oluntary allowance of 
what is planned or done by another.”46 The dictionary further defines 
“voluntary” as “[a]rising from one’s own free will.”47  
This definition raises some questions. How voluntary does a 
person’s decision have to be before that decision counts as consent 
within the meaning of an autonomous choice?48 Is it “voluntary” if 
one does not have the necessary information to make the decision? Is 
it “voluntary” if one makes a choice without being aware that 
someone manipulated the information? 
A survey of consent scholarship shows general agreement that 
certain prerequisites must exist before consent can reflect autonomous 
choices.49 Scholars have identified what they call “informed consent” 
as consent that reflects an individual’s autonomy.50 Under the 
informed consent analysis, in order to give consent, one needs volition 
(the power to use one’s will), information, and comprehension.51 
The volition requirement of consent “requires conditions free of 
coercion and undue influence.”52 Coercion occurs when one person 
threatens to harm the other person in order to obtain consent.53 
“Undue influence, by contrast, occurs through an offer of an excessive, 
unwarranted, inappropriate or improper reward or other overture in 
order to obtain compliance.”54 Additionally, “inducements that would 
 
46. Webster’s II New College Dictionary 245 (3d ed. 2005). 
47. Id. at 1267. 
48. See Trebilcock, supra note 7, at 127 (“From an autonomy perspective, 
where choices are made on the basis of critically defective information, 
at some point such choices presumably cease to satisfy the conditions for 
an autonomous choice.”). 
49. See, e.g., id. at 102 (emphasizing that “[e]ven the most committed 
proponents of free markets and freedom of contract recognize that 
certain information preconditions must be met for a given exchange” to 
be efficient). 
50. Julia A. Pedroni & Kenneth D. Pimple, A Brief Introduction to 
Informed Consent in Research with Human Subjects 4–5 (2001). 
51. Nat’l Comm’n for the Prot. of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
& Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Princi-
ples and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Research 10–14 (1978) [hereinafter Belmont Report]. 
52. Id. at 14.  
53. Id. 
54. Id.; see also Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539 
(Ct. App. 1966) (“[A] person’s will may be overborne without 
misrepresentation.”). 
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ordinarily be acceptable may become undue influences if the subject is 
especially vulnerable.”55  
The next requirement of informed consent requires access to 
information.56 Even when one has the will to become informed, one 
needs to have the necessary information. If one cannot have physical 
access to information, one cannot evaluate all the options.57 Consent 
based on limited information cannot be consent that promotes 
individual autonomy and freedom of contract.58  
Furthermore, mere physical possession of information without 
comprehension will not result in consent, either.59 Comprehension is 
thus an important requirement for meaningful consent. The ability to 
understand depends on intelligence, rationality, maturity, and 
language.60 Comprehension is influenced by internal constraints such 
as cognitive ability and decision-making biases and external 
constraints such as cultural biases and marketplace manipulations.61  
Let us consider the following consent scenarios against the 
backdrop of the informed consent discussion.62 
1. Party B had all the information and understood all the infor-
mation. Party B carefully weighed all of his options by 
considering the costs and benefits of each option. Party B was 
in a position to negotiate with Party A. After negotiating with 
Party A on several issues, Party B signed the agreement. 
 
55. Belmont Report, supra note 51, at 14. A California court described 
undue influence as “a shorthand legal phrase used to describe persuasion 
which tends to be coercive in nature, persuasion which overcomes the 
will without convincing the judgment.” Odorizzi, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 539. 
As the court later acknowledged, “[t]he difficulty, of course, lies in 
determining when the forces of persuasion have overflowed their normal 
banks and become oppressive flood waters.” Id. at 541. Product 
advertising influences people’s decisions, but it is tolerated, and most 
would agree that it does not rise to the level of undue influence.  
56. Belmont Report, supra note 51, at 11–12. 
57. Pedroni & Pimple, supra note 50, at 5–6. 
58. Id. at 6. 
59. Id.  
60. Belmont Report, supra note 51, at 12. 
61. See id. at 13 (explaining that “[s]pecial provision[s]” might need to be 
made for those with impaired cognitive abilities such as mental 
disability). 
62. This is a crude attempt to categorize certain situations implicating 
consent analysis for the sake of articulating the issues raised by contract 
law’s focus on consent. Some of the examples are derived from actual 
court cases, summarized and abbreviated to highlight the defect with 
consent.  
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2. Party B had all the information and thought that he under-
stood everything, but unbeknownst to him, Party A had delib-
erately designed and presented the options to lead Party B to 
the option preferred by Party A. Party A’s options were de-
signed to exploit human decision-making biases identified by 
behavioral studies. Party B chose the predicted option and 
signed the agreement. 
3. Party B had all the information and understood the infor-
mation. However, Party B was not in a position to negotiate 
and had no alternatives anyway. Party B signed the agreement. 
4. Party B had all the information, but Party B did not under-
stand the information or Party B did not bother to read the 
agreement. Nonetheless, Party B signed the agreement. 
5. Party A failed to disclose a material fact to Party B. Party B 
signed the agreement. 
6. Party A misrepresented a material fact. Relying on the misrep-
resentation, Party B signed the agreement. 
7. Party B was confined in a cast in a hospital. Party A spent two 
hours persuading Party B to sign an agreement to release claims 
for personal injuries in exchange for a relatively small sum. At 
the time of signing, Party B was in a highly nervous and 
hysterical condition and suffering much pain, and she signed the 
release in order to get rid of Party A. 
8. Party A told Party B that Party B would be hanged or thrown 
into the river if he did not sign the agreement. Party B signed 
the agreement. 
These scenarios of consent present a spectrum of consent, from 
informed consent to increasingly problematic consent. At both extremes 
(Scenarios 1 and 8), the answer is easy. At one end of the spectrum 
with Scenario 1, we have informed consent where a party gives consent 
knowingly—with full information and comprehension. In that situation, 
Party B is not coerced. Party B has access to information and 
understands all the information. Party B can weigh the costs and 
benefits and negotiate with Party A. Scenario 1 agreements embody the 
ideal paradigm upon which contract law is based.  
At the other end of the spectrum with Scenario 8, there is only 
apparent consent obtained as a result of threats of physical harm. All 
reasonable people would agree that the transaction involved no 
meaningful consent. Enforcing a Scenario 8 agreement would not 
advance contract law’s goal of protecting individual autonomy and 
freedom of contract. Under contract law, courts have refused to 
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enforce that type of agreement.63 Contract law defenses such as fraud, 
duress, and undue influence recognize the defects in consent in 
Scenarios 6, 7 and 8.64  
But the decision gets harder in agreements falling between the 
two extreme ends. Scenario 2 raises the consent problem with which 
this Article is concerned. As discussed below, current contract law’s 
consent-centric approach means that most of the contracts between 
Scenarios 2 and 5 will be enforced by the courts despite the problems 
that speak against the existence of a truly voluntary consent.  
II. Consent and Contract Law  
This Part examines the ways contract law has relied on consent 
to justify its choice to side with one private party over the other. This 
Part briefly reviews contract law formation doctrines, defenses, and 
interpretation and construction principles and points out that the con-
sent concept is reflected in numerous contract law doctrines. Applica-
tion of contract law doctrines is essentially a quest for parties’ consent.  
A. Consent and Contract Formation 
The consent concept is reflected in contract law doctrines 
governing contract formation such as offer, acceptance, mutual assent, 
and intent. These concepts are essentially vehicles for courts to 
determine whether consent exists.65 Because courts do not have mind-
reading ability, courts have to rely on observable evidence to 
ascertain whether parties consented.66 The task is made more difficult 
 
63. See, e.g., Brown v. Pierce, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 205, 214 (1868) (“[M]oral 
compulsion, such as that produced by threats to take life or to inflict 
great bodily harm, as well as that produced by imprisonment, is 
everywhere regarded as sufficient, in law, to destroy free agency, 
without which there can be no contract, because, in that state of the 
case, there is no consent.”).  
64. See Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent 
Theory, 54 Mont. L. Rev. 169, 193 (1993) (noting that liberalism has 
promoted “the idea of limits to freedom of contract and has endorsed 
doctrines such as duress and unconscionability that are said typically to 
‘police’ the bargain”). 
65. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 304 (“Contract theory searches for the 
‘extra’ factor that, if present, justifies the legal enforcement of a 
commitment or promise.”). One can question whether the concepts of 
offer, acceptance, and assent or intent necessarily equal the concept of 
consent. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the subtle 
differences between these concepts. Suffice it to say that, in most cases, 
consent is implicit in those terms, and a search for offer, acceptance, and 
assent or intent is really a search for consent.  
66. See id. at 305 (“[We] learn the meaning of terms by comparing (1) the 
conduct of persons with their words, or (2) their conduct and words in 
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because courts have to ascertain the existence of consent after a 
dispute has arisen. When parties are in a dispute, they generally will 
have conflicting and self-serving testimony about whether one party 
consented. But courts cannot read the consenter’s mind. By necessity, 
courts have developed doctrines to assist them in this task.  
An examination of those doctrines reveals that courts have primarily 
adopted an objective approach to ascertain the existence of consent.67 
Under the objective test, courts look at objective manifestations of 
intent—essentially, what a reasonable person looking at the outward 
manifestation would have understood the intent to be.68 The professed 
reason for the objective test is to protect certainty of contracts and the 
other party’s reliance on the promisor’s manifestations.69  
To assess whether a party has consented, courts focus on evidence 
such as signature on an agreement, spoken words, or other actions 
related to the transaction. Courts have placed heavy emphasis on a 
party’s signature.70 They have held a party accountable for giving an 
 
one context with those in another, or (3) one person’s conduct and 
words with another person’s conduct and words.”). 
67. See Mautner, supra note 4, at 551 (“[O]ver the course of the twentieth 
century, the objective approach evolved into one of the most entrenched 
dogmas of contract law.”); see also Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., 
93 A.2d 272, 279 (Md. 1952) (“[W]here there has been an integration of 
an agreement, those who executed it will not be allowed to place their 
own interpretation on what it means or was intended to mean. The test 
in such case is objective and not subjective.”); Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 21 (1981) (rejecting the subjective approach). For an 
interesting perspective on the origins of the objective theory, see Joseph 
M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation 
and Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 427, 428 (2000) (stating that 
“objective approaches have predominated in the common law of 
contracts since time immemorial” and describing “a brief but almost 
inconsequential flirtation with subjective approaches in the mid-
nineteenth century”). 
68. Mautner, supra note 4, at 551. 
69. See Perillo, supra note 67, at 442–43 (discussing the desire for certainty 
throughout the jurisprudence of the early republic). 
70. See e.g., MCC–Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova 
d’Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1387 n.9 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[P]arties 
who sign contracts will be bound by them regardless of whether they 
have read them or understood them.”); Linville v. Ginn Real Estate Co., 
697 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1308–09 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“A party who signs an 
instrument is presumed to know its contents. . . . He cannot avoid his 
obligations thereunder by alleging that he did not read the contract, or 
that the terms were not explained to him, or that he did not understand 
the provisions.” (alteration in original) (quoting Benoay v. E.F. Hutton 
& Co., 699 F. Supp. 1523, 1529 (S.D. Fla. 1988))); Reliable Fin. Co. v. 
Axon, 336 So. 2d 1271, 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding “that a 
party to a writing cannot deny its contents on the ground that he [or 
she] signed it without reading it”).  
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impression of assent when a party signed a contract even though the 
party might not have read or understood the terms.71 Courts have 
often stated that parties have a duty to read the document before 
they sign it.72 Accordingly, if a party objectively manifests assent to 
be bound to a contract (the best example is by signing a contract), a 
court will almost automatically find assent to all terms contained in 
the writing. Typically, Courts readily dismiss parties’ statements such 
as, “I didn’t read it” or “I didn’t understand it,” absent circumstances 
which give rise to contract law defenses such as fraud, 
unconscionability, or incompetence.73 
The objective test furthers important goals of certainty and 
predictability of contract. Scholars and courts have identified the ad-
vantages of this approach.74 It provides certainty of contract so that the 
parties can rely on contractual agreements. It encourages individual 
responsibility.75 One better think carefully before one signs because one 
will be held responsible for one’s actions. It also eliminates problems of 
proof and results in judicial efficiency because the signature is in black 
and white. However, because it focuses on outward manifestations, it 
could result in consent being found even though the party did not 
consent.76 Because of market manipulation of information, it is 
 
71. See, e.g., Dixon v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 
1331–32 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (dismissing plaintiff borrower’s claims because 
the plaintiff reviewed and signed the loan documents at closing).  
72. See, e.g., Reliable Fin., 336 So. 2d at 1274 (“It is the duty of every 
contracting party to learn and know its contents before he signs and 
delivers it.” (quoting All Fla. Sur. Co. v. Coker, 88 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. 
1956))); see also cases cited supra note 70. 
73. See, e.g., Silver v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 
1330, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (granting summary judgment in favor of the 
lender and denying the borrower’s claims of fraud, conspiracy to 
defraud, and unfair trade practices because she was deemed to have 
knowledge of the document she signed); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the 
Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 464 (1897) (“[T]he making of a contract 
depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the 
agreement of two sets of external signs,—not on the parties’ having 
meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.”).  
74. See, e.g., Universal Studios, Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 705 A.2d 579, 589 
(Del. Ch. 1997) (“The necessity of preserving predictability and stability 
in commercial transactions is fostered by this objective view of 
contracts . . . .”); Alces, supra note 18 at 1517–18 (explaining that the 
objective test “make[s] questions relating to the formation of contract 
and the incidents of contract liability easier to resolve”). 
75. Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion 
and Unconscionability, 66 La. L. Rev. 123, 129–30 (2005).  
76. See Mautner, supra note 4, at 562 (arguing that one of four assumptions 
implicit in contract interpretation is that the contracting parties share a 
“cultural environment” that gives unequivocal meaning to the content of 
the contract). Professor Barnett argued that the objective approach is 
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increasingly common for there to be a manifestation of consent without 
any meaningful consent.77  
Another contract law principle that affects contract law’s consent 
analysis is the well-established rule that parties do not owe each other 
a duty of good faith prior to the formation of the contract.78 Contract 
law assumes that parties bargain at arms’ length, which means that 
parties generally do not have a duty to disclose in the negotiation 
process.79 Without access to information, one party may consent to 
the transaction without intending to do so.  
B. Consent and Contract Defenses 
Contract law has long recognized some obvious defects with 
consent. It has attempted to deal with the defects by allowing certain 
defenses. These contract law defenses mark the outer boundaries of 
consent enforceable under contract law. Contract law defenses fail, 
however, to address the more subtle consent problems identified in 
this Article.80 
 
consistent with the liberty interest that contract law protects because 
the objective approach respects and protects “the rights and liberty 
interests of others, whose plans and expectations would be severely lim-
ited if they were not entitled to rely on things as they appear to be and 
to take the assertive conduct of others at face value.” Barnett, supra 
note 4, at 306. It is certainly true that the objective approach protects 
the reliance interests of the promisee. But the objective approach may be 
only paying lip service to the liberty interests of the promisor if it results 
in enforcing a promise that the promisor has no intention of making. Even 
more concerning is a situation where a promisor is deliberately misled into 
agreeing to certain terms because of lack of informed consent due to 
information asymmetry and marketplace manipulations. The protection of 
the promisee’s reliance interest under an objective theory seems to serve 
the interests of certainty and fairness to the promisee rather than respect-
ing the liberty interests of the promisor. See Mautner, supra note 4, at 
552–53 (arguing that the shift from subjectivism to objectivism was a 
“shift from an ethos of individualism and self-reliance to one of 
responsibility, both private and collective, towards others,” and a shift 
aimed at promoting “certainty and predictability”). 
77. See Radin, supra note 10, at 1128 (arguing that the advent of 
cyberspace contracts will make the conflict between the consent-based 
system and nonconsensual practices more urgent). 
78. See Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank 
Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 503, 522 (1991) (stating 
that good faith is “relative to the agreement of the parties”). 
79. Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1349, 1357–58 (2009). 
80. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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Courts have refused to uphold contracts signed as a result of 
duress.81 These defenses involve situations where one party has 
obtained consent improperly. As illustrated by Scenario 8, duress 
involves the situation where the promisee used actual physical force or 
unlawful threat of death or bodily harm.82 In this type of situation, it is 
easy to conclude that no meaningful consent exists because there is no 
free will.  
Where one party had misrepresented an existing fact, courts have 
also refused to enforce the promise against the consenter who relied on 
the misrepresentation.83 Misrepresentation involves situations where the 
promisee obtained the other party’s consent by making a fraudulent 
misrepresentation about a material fact, with knowledge of its falsity 
and with the intent to induce the other party to enter into the 
contract, and where the other party justifiably relied on the 
misrepresentation.84 This defense reflects contract law’s recognition 
that there is no free will in such a context. The misrepresentation 
deprived the promisor of the information necessary for consent.  
Courts have also relied on the doctrine of unconscionability to 
refuse enforcement of a contract in certain limited situations.85 
Unconscionability involves situations where one party uses a strong 
bargaining position or unethical tactics to take advantage of another’s 
weakness, ignorance, or distress.86 This defense is the broadest and 
has the potential to undo many contracts where consent does not 
exist. As explained below, however, courts have applied the doctrine 
 
81. See, e.g., Ortt v. Schwartz, 62 Pa. Super. 70, 74–75 (1916) (stating that 
contracts produced under intimidation are voidable, but threats of 
arrest before commencement of such proceedings are not enough to con-
stitute duress). 
82. See Brown v. Pierce, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 205, 209–10, 216 (1868) (finding 
that contracts or deeds procured through fear of loss of life by the other 
party are voidable). 
83. See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906, 908–09 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1968) (finding that representations by a dance studio that the 
appellant was a graceful dancer in order to induce her to purchase more 
dance lessons to be false and thus a misrepresentation of fact). 
84. For an example of a misrepresentation, see id. 
85. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that it is unconscionable when a party with 
little bargaining power signs a contract with little or no knowledge of its 
contents).  
86. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971) 
(refusing to enforce a contract where the stronger party used unequal 
bargaining power to its advantage and where the weaker party did not 
graduate from high school, did not know the law or understand the 
technical terms, and had never read the lease, and where enforcing the 
contract would cost the weaker party thousands of dollars for negligence 
he did not cause). 
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very narrowly. The doctrine in practice has not been used to correct 
the more subtle consent problems.  
Other contract defenses, such as mistake and incompetence (also 
referred to as incapacity or infancy), recognize the fact that the 
consenter does not have necessary information because of a fundamen-
tal mistake or lacks the mental capacity to consent due to mental 
disease or age. The defense of mistake (either mutual or unilateral) can 
defeat the formation of a contract where the mistake was about a basic 
assumption of contract and the mistake had a material effect on the 
agreed-upon exchange of performances.87 These defenses also rest on the 
notion that the parties would not have consented had they known 
about the mistake or had the capacity to consent. 
Additional recognition of defects with consent is reflected in 
doctrines that would excuse the promisor from performance under the 
contract. The doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustra-
tion recognize the human inability to anticipate all future events that 
might affect performance.88 These doctrines excuse a promisor from 
his promise if an event occurs whose nonoccurrence was a basic 
assumption upon which consent was based.89 Contract excuses reflect 
judicial recognition of the human inability to see into the future and 
courts’ unwillingness to stretch the consent concept too far.90  
C. Consent and Contract Interpretation 
The consent concept also permeates contract interpretation princi-
ples. Sometimes, parties dispute the terms of their contract. Courts are 
left with the task of determining what the parties have agreed to. In 
this area, courts have adopted certain well-established principles as 
tools. Those principles reflect contract law’s consent-concentric 
 
87. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (holding that 
the defendant seller could rescind the contract of sale if the jury found 
that the cow, known as “Rose 2d of Aberlone,” was sold upon the 
understanding of both parties that she was barren and useless for 
breeding while in fact she was not barren). 
88. See Barrack v. City of Lafayette, 829 P.2d 424, 428–29 (Colo. App. 1991) 
(holding that a new regulation by the Colorado Department of Health, 
which required all surface water to be treated before delivery, made it 
illegal for the City of Lafayette to deliver untreated water, and thus under 
the doctrine of impossibility the city was discharged of all contractual 
duties that might require it to supply citizens with untreated water).  
89. Id. at 428. 
90. Another contract law defense is based on public policy grounds. Courts 
have refused to enforce certain contracts if they are illegal. E.g., Hendrix 
v. McKee, 575 P.2d 134, 137 (Or. 1978). This defense is not driven by 
the concerns for consent. Instead, the defense reflects a collective social 
judgment that those contracts are so offensive that courts will not 
enforce them, even if consent exists, because of other overriding public 
policy concerns. Id. 
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approach. Like contract formation doctrines, defenses, and excuses, 
these well-established contract law doctrines tend to favor the written 
agreement considered to be the best evidence of the parties’ consent. 
For example, one of the rules of contract construction is the well-
established four corners doctrine.91 Under the doctrine, a judge is 
supposed to stay within the four corners of the contract when 
interpreting a written contract to ascertain the intent of the parties.92 
Another related doctrine, the plain meaning rule, requires courts to 
interpret a written contract in accordance with its plain meaning if 
the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous.93 Both doctrines 
focus on the written language in a contract.  
The parol evidence rule is another well-established contract law 
principle that bars introduction into evidence of any prior or 
contemporaneous written or oral agreement to contradict the explicit 
terms of the written contract.94 To invoke this doctrine, many contracts 
typically contain a standard merger or integration clause that expressly 
states that the written contract is the final expression of the parties’ 
intent and that it merges all prior or contemporaneous agreements 
between the parties.95 The parol evidence rule thus favors the written 
agreement and reflects contract law’s focus on objective consent. 
D. Current Contract Law’s Enforcement of Contract Under Consent 
Application of the above contract law doctrines leads to the 
enforcement of all of the contracts falling within Scenario 1. That is 
not controversial. However, under current standards, most contracts 
in Scenarios 2 through 5 will also be enforced even though the consent 
in those cases is problematic.96  
Contract law now generally enforces contracts like the one in Sce-
nario 2 despite the consent defect.97 In certain extreme cases involving  
91. See, e.g., Midwest Builder Distrib., Inc. v. Lord & Essex, Inc., 891 
N.E.2d 1, 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“[W]hen interpreting an integrated 
contract, courts are limited to considering material that lies within the 
four corners of the text, rather than resorting to extrinsic evidence.”). 
92. Id. 
93. See, e.g., Foothill Capital Corp. v. E. Coast Bldg. Supply Co., 259 B.R. 
840, 845 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that because both parties conceded that 
the language of loan documents was clear and unambiguous, the court’s 
inquiry into the parties’ intent was limited to the loan documents). 
94. See, e.g., Williams v. Spitzer Autoworld Canton, L.L.C., 913 N.E.2d 410, 
415–16 (Ohio 2009) (holding that the parol evidence rule prohibited 
evidence of an oral agreement that contradicted the terms of the written 
contract). 
95. See, e.g., id. at 413 (noting that the contract at issue had a merger 
clause). 
96. See subprime mortgage cases cited supra note 16. 
97. Id.  
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unequal bargaining power and substantive unfairness, courts have 
refused to enforce contracts similar to those in Scenarios 3 through 5 
by resorting to contract law defenses such as the doctrine of 
unconscionability. But courts have been unwilling to expand the 
doctrine of unconscionability.98 As a result, many of the contracts 
falling within Scenarios 2 to 5 have been enforced.  
As we approach the more problematic end of the consent 
spectrum (i.e., contracts falling within Scenarios 6, 7, and 8), courts 
have been more willing to invoke current contract law defenses such 
as fraud, duress, and undue influence and have struck down those 
agreements.99 As it stands right now, contract law enforces contracts 
in multiple situations where consent is defective. 
III. Problems with Contract Law’s Consent Focus 
Contract law’s focus on consent seemingly offers an objective way 
to assess whether a contract should be enforced. But as described in 
the above Part, the objective approach to ascertaining the existence 
of consent frequently results in enforcing agreements that do not 
reflect meaningful consent (for example, agreements falling within 
Scenarios 2 through 5). Contract law has not answered many of the 
hard questions related to the consent concept in light of 
unprecedented marketplace manipulation of information as a result of 
better understanding of the human decision-making process.  
Contract law should reevaluate its consent-centric approach in light 
of the many problems associated with consent. Consent is a motivation-
ally complex concept to begin with.100 The consent concept is easily 
manipulated, and this compounds its inherent complexity. There is 
strong evidence of marketplace manipulation targeting human biases.101 
The existence of apparent consent based on objective indicia, such as a 
signature on a written document, cannot be presumed to reflect the 
individual will where the other party has manipulated information. 
The increasing use of standard form contracts and cyberspace 
contracts also makes it necessary for contract law to abandon its 
 
98. See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Func-
tion, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 73, 101 (2006) (arguing that consumers rarely file 
or settle claims in part because of courts’ adverse attitudes toward 
unconscionability claims).  
99. See, e.g., Brown v. Pierce, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 205, 209–10 (1868) (finding 
threats to life as a form of duress); Weger v. Rocha, 32 P.2d 417, 420 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934) (finding that the agreement was signed by 
the plaintiff under undue influence while she was seriously injured and 
in a nervous condition).  
100. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
101. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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consent focus.102 In those situations, there is an increasing disconnect 
between consent in contract law and consent in reality.103 Contract 
law’s traditional search for consent is inappropriate in those 
situations. Maintaining the consent focus will put contract law in the 
untenable position of having to maintain a fiction when it is not 
possible to find meaningful consent.  
Current contract law defenses are insufficient to overcome the bias of 
a consent-focused approach. As long as contract law remains consent 
centric and contract law doctrines remain oriented toward the search for 
consent, it does not solve the fundamental problems of power imbalance 
and contract law’s potential to perpetuate that imbalance.104 
A. The Motivational Complexity of Consent 
Consent is an intentional behavior, and it is an act of meaning 
that necessarily derives its meaning from the sociocultural context in 
which it is recognized.105 Concepts such as choice or consent can mean 
different things to different people depending on their cultural 
background and social class.106  
For example, Professor West described the characters in the 
fictional world of Franz Kafka and contrasted that world against the 
ideal one envisioned by law and economics scholar Richard Posner. 
She pointed out that in both worlds, consent was used to “validat[e] 
otherwise unappealing states of affairs.”107 She described consent as an 
“ambiguously motivated human act” and cautioned against relying on 
consent as a basis for moral justification.108 
Consent is also a culturally dependent concept. Studies have 
shown that middle-class Americans tend to value choice more so than 
people from working-class or other cultural backgrounds.109 The sig-
nificance of these findings is that people may be motivated by 
multiple factors when they “consent.”  
 
102. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
103. Radin, supra note 10, at 1128. 
104. Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 
41 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 175, 198–99 (2009). 
105. Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning 28–29 (1990). 
106. Nicole M. Stephens, Hazel Rose Markus & Sarah S.M. Townsend, 
Choice as an Act of Meaning: The Case of Social Class, 93 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 814 (2007); see also West, supra note 
7, at 386–88 (comparing consent in Posner’s world of welfare maximizing 
individuals with Kafka’s world of authoritarian personalities).  
107. West, supra note 7, at 386. 
108. Id. at 425. 
109. See Stephens, Markus & Townsend, supra note 106, at 815 (“[I]ndepend-
ence is the dominant discourse in mainstream American society . . . .”).  
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The country we live in today is very different from the country 
during the nineteenth century when contract law experienced its 
growth.110 According to 2010 census data, the landscape of the U.S. 
population is rapidly changing. Although whites remain the 
majority,111 there were substantial increases in minority populations 
between 2000 and 2010.112 For example, the Hispanic and Asian 
groups each increased by 43 percent.113 
Contract law’s consent focus, viewed from the colored lens of 
dominant western values, will often result in enforcing an agreement 
where there is no consent. The result will be use of state power in 
favor of those with more resources.114 
B. Marketplace Manipulation of Consent 
Consent’s complexity poses even more challenges when 
marketplace actors devote substantial resources to manipulate 
people’s consent. Behavioral studies in the last three decades have 
demonstrated that the human decision-making process can be easily 
manipulated.115 Human beings suffer from predictable biases.116 We 
 
110. See Mautner, supra note 4, at 552–53 (discussing the shift from 
subjectivism to objectivism in contract law during the nineteenth 
century). 
111. According to the 2010 census, “White” refers to a person having origins 
in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North 
Africa. Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto R. 
Ramirez, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010 Census 
Briefs 3 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/ 
briefs/c2010br-02.pdf. It includes people who indicated their race as 
“White” or reported entries such as Irish, German, Italian, Lebanese, 
Arab, Moroccan, or Caucasian. Id. So “White” is not as monocultural as 
the label suggests.  
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 3, 5. 
114. One of the impetuses for the Occupy Wall Street Movement is economic 
inequality. Occupy Wall Street, supra note 25.  
115. See, e.g., Ariely, supra note 37, at 317 (“But, as the results presented 
in this book (and others) show, . . . [o]ur irrational behaviors are neither 
random nor senseless—they are systematic and predictable.”); 
Kahneman, supra note 13, at 8–10 (explaining that “heuristics and 
biases” are becoming increasingly studied in fields outside psychology). 
One could argue that human manipulation of information and of each 
other has been present since the beginning of time. The oldest example of 
that is when Eve persuaded Adam to eat the fruit from the Forbidden 
Tree. That is why businesses spend money on advertising. Although 
manipulation has always been present, manipulation at such sophisticated 
levels and on such a scale has only been present for the last couple of 
decades. Difficult as it is, contract law needs to draw a line between what 
is acceptable and what is not. The reasonableness standard proposed in 
this Article allows a court to draw the line appropriately. Contract law’s 
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tend to be overly optimistic and myopic, and we place too little 
weight on future costs and benefits and too much weight on short-
term costs and benefits.117 Individuals also tend to misjudge the likeli-
hood of a future event. They rely on the shortcut of a small sample of 
present events as indicative of future events while ignoring other 
evidence, such as prior occurrences and the quality of the sample.118 
These biases lead to systematic underestimation of future risks.119  
The human tendency to rely on shortcuts to make decisions often 
leads to predictable mistakes.120 For example, when making a decision, 
we tend to rely on information that is salient or available to us 
(referred to as the saliency effect).121 These known biases make it 
possible to predict people’s irrationality.122 Studies have shown that 
what people choose tends to be influenced by how the choices are 
presented to them (referred to as the framing effect).123  
Manipulating those biases was exactly what happened in 
transactions leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis.124 In those 
transactions, lenders manipulated borrowers with less information 
through deliberate contract design.125 Subprime loan products with 
cost deferral features took advantage of people’s inherent biases. The 
borrowers focused on short-term benefits and underestimated future 
risks.126 Those mortgage products were also deliberately designed to 
be so complicated that borrowers could not properly assess the 
risks.127 
 
tolerance of unbridled marketplace manipulation will end up using the 
coercive power of the state to aid the manipulator. 
116. Ariely, supra note 37, at 317. 
117. See id. at 320 (“It is difficult to sacrifice consumption today for saving 
in the distant future, but it is psychologically easier to sacrifice 
consumption in the future . . . .”).  
118. Kahneman, supra note 13, at 8–10. 
119. Id. 
120. Id.  
121. Id. 
122. Ariely, supra note 37, at 317.  
123. Kahneman, supra note 13, at 88. 
124. Bar-Gill, supra note 14, at 1120–21; White, supra note 14, at 158–59. 
125. Bar-Gill, supra note 14, at 1079–80; White, supra note 14, at 158–60.  
126. See David Faber, And Then the Roof Caved In 45 (2009) (discuss-
ing how after a twenty-minute phone call, borrowers could have a loan 
cleared within a week). For a detailed discussion of how lenders 
exploited these decisional biases in consumer contract contexts, see 
White, supra note 14, at 158–60, and the articles cited therein. 
127. See Edmund L. Andrews, Busted: Life Inside the Great Mort-
gage Meltdown 77 (2009) (pointing out that even former Federal 
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C. The Growing Disconnect Between Consent and  
Commercial Contract Practices 
Commercial contract practices, such as the increasingly common 
use of form contracts and cyberspace contracts, also make it more 
urgent to reexamine the consent-focused approach.128 The exponential 
increase in cyberspace commercial transactions means that more and 
more contracts are being entered into electronically. In cyberspace 
transactions a user is typically required to agree by clicking on the 
“OK” button.129 In those cases, users often do not see the terms before 
the transaction,130 or they have not read the terms before they click 
on the button indicating acceptance of those terms. In those cases, it 
is difficult to imagine that informed consent exists.131  
As Professor Radin pointed out, the advent of cyberspace 
contracting exposes the consent problem. She pointed out that “[t]he 
problem, in a nutshell, is that our ordinary-discourse commitment to 
a consent-based system will come into clearer conflict with practices 
that do not seem consensual.”132 
It is clear that cyberspace contracting is here to stay.133 Contract 
law’s consent centric-approach presents a court with this dilemma: If 
the court is true to the consent concept, it will have to strike down 
cyberspace contracts for lack of consent. One cannot seriously argue 
that a buyer has consented at the time of contracting when the buyer 
 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan acknowledged “that a person with a 
PhD in mathematics wouldn’t understand them”).  
128. Radin, supra note 10, at 1128. 
129. See id. at 1128–30 (describing various “contract as click” agreements).  
130. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(finding that the defendant’s use of the software after purchase, coupled 
with a license agreement that appeared on screen, constituted 
acceptance). The ProCD case presented an extreme example of the 
disconnect between contract law and marketplace practices. Judge 
Easterbrook held that a “contract” was enforceable even though the 
buyer did not know about the contract when he purchased the product. 
Id. This raises the interesting issue of whether consent is a necessary 
element of a contract, which is beyond the scope of this Article. 
131. I have to confess that I have personally clicked on an “accept” button 
on many occasions. A few times, I did make a valiant effort to read and 
understand the contract terms, but gave up when it became too time 
consuming and I needed to use the software. On those occasions, I 
hoped silently that the terms I had just accepted were reasonable terms.  
132. Radin, supra note 10, at 1128. 
133. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451 (pointing out that these types of 
business practices, “[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a 
right to return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a 
right that the license expressly extends), may be a means of doing 
business valuable to buyers and sellers alike”). 
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has never read the contract. That would mean that a large number of 
cyberspace contracts would not be upheld regardless of the practical 
necessity of having to rely on those contracts to move cyberspace 
commerce forward. On the other hand, if a court chooses to uphold 
such a contract, it will necessarily appear to be paying lip service to the 
consent concept.134 By finding consent where there is none, the court is 
not only damaging its own credibility and the legitimacy of contract 
law as an institution, but also denigrating the ideals imbued in the 
concept.  
D. Insufficiency of Current Contract Defenses  
Can current contract law defenses address the defects related to 
consent? Yes, but only to a certain extent. In the scenarios set forth 
in Part I.B, courts have applied contract law defenses to strike down 
agreements falling within Scenarios 6, 7, and 8. But so long as the 
analysis begins with a search for consent, courts are unlikely to apply 
these contract law defenses to contracts with consent defects 
identified in Scenarios 2 through 5. A different mindset and standard 
are necessary to address those consent problems.  
Judges, like other humans, suffer from decisional biases. For a 
judge with a traditional commitment to the consent focus, contract 
law defenses will not be sufficient to address the more subtle consent 
problems identified in Scenarios 2 through 5. That explains why 
courts have mostly enforced contracts similar to those in Scenarios 2 
through 5.135 Behavioral studies have shown that humans are easily 
influenced by what they are exposed to, a phenomenon known as the 
priming effect,136 the anchoring effect,137 and availability bias.138 Since 
courts are primed to think that consent is sufficient to justify 
enforcement of contracts, they have proven very reluctant to rely on 
 
134. Judge Easterbrook faced this dilemma in ProCD and he apparently 
chose the more practical approach. As a result, he was widely criticized. 
See, e.g., Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, 
Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook 
Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & Pol’y 641, 641–43 (2004) (providing 
multiple articles that disagree with Judge Easterbrook’s opinion). For 
other examples of courts paying lip service to consent, see cases cited 
supra notes 70–72.  
135. See discussion supra Part I.B. and cases cited therein. 
136. See Kahneman, supra note 13, at 52–53 (demonstrating that the 
priming effect will lead people to complete “SO_P” with “SOUP” 
instead of “SOAP” after having recently seen or heard “EAT”). 
  
137. See id. at 122–24 (discussing various studies showing how people 
readjust their guesses after hearing another possible answer). 
138. See id. at 129–35 (describing various studies showing that if people can 
come up with many instances of a particular class, they will judge that 
category to be large).  
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any contract law defenses to undo a contract where apparent consent 
seems to exist.  
For example, courts have been extremely reluctant to apply the 
doctrine of unconscionability.139 Conceived in equity, this doctrine 
could have been used to undo contracts where consent was problem-
atic. An expansive application of the doctrine of unconscionability 
could, for example, result in voiding those agreements in Scenarios 2 
through 5. But courts have not done so.140 Courts have applied the 
doctrine only in limited situations involving unequal bargaining power 
and unfair terms.141 The cases where courts have applied the doctrine 
typically involve a consumer who signed a standard form contract—
drafted by the more powerful party and with draconian terms 
favoring the powerful party.142 It is very rare to have a successful 
unconscionability defense in a commercial context.143 Courts have only 
found an agreement unconscionable where it offended notions of 
“decency,” or had grossly unfair results—all viewed in the context of 
a firm commitment to the consent concept.144  
 
139. See generally Schmitz, supra note 98 (discussing in depth the 
development of the unconscionability doctrine). 
140. See cases arising out of subprime mortgage crisis, supra note 16. 
141. See generally Paul Bennett Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the 
Doctrine of Unconscionability, 53 Clev. St. L. Rev. 187 (2005–06) 
(arguing to update, or even eliminate, current unconscionability doctrine 
and govern potentially unconscionable contracts by various legislative 
regimes). 
142. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–
50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and 
hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonably contract with 
little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his 
consent . . . was ever given to all the terms. In such a case . . . 
enforcement should be withheld.”). 
143. See Schmitz, supra note 98, at 101 (describing legislative attempts to 
limit unconscionable contracts by permitting merchants to elect states 
that enforce form contracts). 
144. See Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and 
Interpretation Rules: The Need for a Dynamic Approach to Contract 
Disputes, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 506, 551–52 (2005) (“Generally, an 
unconscionable agreement offends notions of ‘decency’ . . . .” (quoting 
Gimbel Bros. Inc. v. Swift, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (Civ. Ct. 1970))); 
Mautner, supra note 4, at 554 (“[T]he culture that judges and lawyers 
internalize in their daily lives determines, in subtle but effective ways, 
the options available to them in making decisions in the law and in 
developing the law. This explanation does not negate the role of 
reflective, conscious legal deliberation in law. Still, it is premised on the 
claim that to act in law is to act within a cultural system, so that a 
good deal of what transpires in law is done on the non-reflective and 
non-conscious level.”). 
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E. Consent and Contract Law Goals 
Contract law’s consent focus may be detrimental to stated 
contract law goals. Scholars have identified various goals of contract 
law, including constraining opportunistic behavior, reducing trans-
action costs, and promoting efficient exchanges.145 Contract law’s 
consent focus actually encourages opportunistic behavior. For 
example, lenders targeting borrowers relied on consent to justify 
inducing borrowers to sign up for subprime mortgage products that 
they could not afford.146 Investment bankers relied on consent to 
justify their sale of risky derivative financial products to third-party 
investors.147 As long as the parties know that their contracts will be 
enforced if they can manage to get the other party to sign the 
contract, the parties are motivated to manipulate the information to 
obtain consent.148  
Contract law’s consent approach will result in increased 
transaction costs. The consent focus will lead to enforcing more and 
more contracts that are not the result of voluntary consent. 
Eventually, this will result in less trust in society.149 When trust is 
low, the transactional costs ex ante are high because people have to 
provide for multiple contingencies not encountered when people trust 
each other.150 The transaction costs ex post are also high when 
unhappy contractual parties sue each other, as evidenced by the 
aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis.151  
 
145. Trebilcock, supra note 7, at 16–17. 
146. For example, lenders were reportedly blaming borrowers for choosing 
their real estate investments or loans with subprime terms. Rick Brooks 
& Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1. 
147. A Wall Street firm was quoted as saying that professional investors 
chose the risk exposure and voluntarily bought derivative financial 
products. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled Bad 
Debt, Bet Against It and Won, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2009, at A1. 
148. See discussions supra Part II.  
149. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and 
the Sinking of the World Economy 289 (2010) (“[W]e have created 
an economic system that encourages shortsighted behavior—behavior 
that is so shortsighted that the costs of the breakdown in trust are never 
taken into account.”).  
150. See Shermer, supra note 40, at 177–78 (quoting Paul Zak, a professor 
of economics at Claremont Graduate University, explaining the positive 
correlation between trust and economic growth). 
151. Navigant Consulting, Inc., a global consulting firm, found that more 
subprime-related lawsuits were filed in the first half of 2008 than in all of 
2007 and that the total number of subprime-related lawsuits exceeded the 
number of lawsuits resulting from the savings and loan crisis in the early 
1990s. Subprime Mortgage Litigation Filings Surpass S&L Benchmark, 
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The consent focus may also undermine the efficiency goal of 
contract law. Contract law’s private ordering paradigm is said to 
promote efficiency because it is presumed that parties would not have 
entered into a contract unless they felt that the transaction would 
have made them better off.152 Hence, when contract law limits itself to 
enforcing the bargain struck by the parties, it is said to be promoting 
efficient exchanges. But that presumption is only valid if the parties 
enter into the transaction voluntarily and with all the information 
necessary to make a decision.153 Because of the problems identified in 
this Article, the focus on consent will lead to enforcing contracts 
without informed decision making. For example, a large number of 
subprime mortgage transactions left millions of people worse off than 
before. Many borrowers might not have entered into these 
transactions had they had access to all the information necessary to 
make an informed decision.  
Ultimately, contract law’s consent-centric approach is unfair to 
people who are not in a good position to help themselves. A legitimate 
governmental goal is to create a society fair for its people. Fairness is 
also embodied in multiple constitutional principles such as the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Contract law’s 
consent approach, seemingly neutral on its face, is unfair to people 
who are not as well informed or endowed with resources.154  
IV. Alternative to a Consent-Focused Approach 
If contract law does not rely on an individual’s consent as a 
lynchpin of enforcement, what test should contract law adopt to 
determine whether to enforce a contract? This Article suggests that 
courts adopt a totality of circumstances test to determine whether a 
contract should be enforced. A totality of circumstances test would be 
more flexible than a consent-focused approach. Instead of trying to 
ascertain whether an individual consented or not—an almost 
 
Navigant Consulting Study Finds, Navigant, 1 (Sept. 10, 2008), 
http://www.navigant.com/~/media/Site/Insights/Financial%20Services/ 
Subprime%20Mortgage%20Litigation%20F_Financial%20Services.ashx. 
Navigant reported that 607 lawsuits were filed in the federal court during 
the 18 months ending in June 2008. Id. This number is higher than the 
number of lawsuits filed in any other major financial crisis. Id.  
152. Trebilcock, supra note 7, at 244 (“The strongest welfare claim that 
can be made on behalf of the private ordering paradigm is from the 
perspective of Pareto efficiency. . . . [I]f two parties are to be observed 
entering into a contract, one should normally presume that they would 
not have done so unless they felt that the contract was likely to make 
them better off.”). 
153. Id.  
154. Dalton, supra note 6, at 1012–21.  
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impossible task due to the complexities of reality—a court should 
examine multiple factors surrounding the entire transaction before it 
enforces a contract. Courts will not have any difficulties applying the 
test. They have applied such a test in multiple contexts.155 The test 
allows courts to utilize their greatest strength—their fact-finding 
expertise.156  
A. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test in Other Contexts 
The totality of circumstances test is no stranger to courts. Courts 
have applied the test in multiple contexts, especially in situations that 
implicate consent. The test reflects the courts’ recognition of the 
perils of relying on outward manifestations of consent. Courts in the 
criminal law context have refused to take the apparent consent of the 
accused at face value.157  
For example, courts have adopted a totality of circumstances test 
to decide whether confessions by an accused in a criminal law context 
are voluntary. In criminal law, courts endorse “the strongly felt attitude 
of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an 
agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings 
a confession out of an accused against his will.”158 To determine 
whether the confession is voluntary, courts apply a totality of the 
 
155. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
156. See United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 
1982) (“[A] court must utilize its fact-finding expertise and judge each 
case on its own facts after considering all the circumstances of the case.”). 
One ready criticism against the adoption of this test is: How can we be 
sure that the courts will get it right? As some scholars have pointed out, 
individual autonomy may be threatened if courts are not good at what 
they are doing. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Remedies When Contracts 
Lack Consent: Autonomy and Institutional Competence, 33 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 209, 233 (1995) (suggesting that if courts do not get it right, 
“the state is not merely failing to prevent infringements of autonomy but 
is actively contributing to those infringements”). The totality of 
circumstances test also encourages more court intervention into private 
contractual relationships and conjures up images of “big brother.” The 
essential question remains: Are we more willing to subject ourselves to 
unbridled marketplace greed or to the government? When the market-
place fails to function in a fair and equitable manner, we have no choice 
but resort to government assistance, imperfect as the solution is.  
157. With limited exceptions, courts in criminal cases are generally 
untroubled by the same problems that plague consent in contract law. 
Yet in both situations, consent is heavily influenced by the circum-
stances surrounding the event. The difference is perhaps caused by the 
fact that in criminal law an individual’s physical liberty and other state 
interests are at stake, while in contract law only economic interests are 
at stake. But is there any reason to treat commercial interests as less 
worthy of protection? This question is reserved for another day. 
158. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206–07 (1960). 
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circumstances test and examine the circumstances of the interrogation, 
instead of focusing on the existence of consent by the accused.159 
Courts also apply a totality of circumstances test in evaluating 
whether a juvenile has waived his or her Miranda rights.160 In that 
context, courts put “a heavy burden . . . on the government to 
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived 
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or 
appointed counsel.”161 The Supreme Court noted that the question of 
whether an accused waived his rights “is not one of form, but rather 
whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the 
rights delineated in the Miranda case.”162 The Court then pointed out 
that the determination whether statements obtained during custodial 
interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon 
an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation.163 In the criminal law context, the “totality of the 
circumstances” test permits a court to look into multiple factors such 
as the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and 
intelligence and into whether he has the capacity to understand the 
warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and 
the consequences of waiving those rights.164  
In another context involving definitional difficulties, courts have also 
applied a totality of circumstances test in evaluating whether a debtor 
satisfied the good faith requirement under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)’s 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.165 Recognizing the inherent difficulty in 
defining “good faith,” one court promulgated a test in which a 
bankruptcy court could utilize its fact-finding expertise and reach a 
decision after considering all the circumstances of a case.166 In consider-
ing whether a Chapter 13 debtor proposed his plan in good faith, courts 
examine factors such as the type of debt sought to be discharged, 
 
159. Id. at 207–08. 
160. See generally Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (finding that a 
juvenile respondent waived his Fifth Amendment rights, notwithstand-
ing his request to see his probation officer); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the government needs to notify arrested 
individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights prior to an 
interrogation).  
161. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
162. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). 
163. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475–77.  
164. Id. at 468–69. 
165. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 1348–49 (8th Cir. 
1990). 
166. United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 316–17 (8th Cir. 
1982). 
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whether the debt is nondischargeable under Chapter 7, and the debtor’s 
motivation and sincerity in seeking Chapter 13 relief.167 Other courts 
have adopted a totality of circumstances test similar to that used by 
the 8th Circuit in LeMaire and Estus to determine whether the 
Chapter 13 debtor has proposed a plan in good faith.168 
Courts have also used a totality of circumstances test in 
ascertaining the existence of probable cause necessary for the issuance 
of a search warrant,169 in determining foreseeability in employer-
liability cases,170 in establishing vicarious liability under the 
Commodities Exchange Act,171 and in determining the validity of 
patents.172 Some courts have adopted a totality of circumstances test 
to determine whether prison conditions violate the Eighth Amend-
 
167. LeMaire, 898 F.2d at 1349. 
168. See, e.g., Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 851 F.2d 852, 859 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (concluding that “the list provided in In re Estus [was] a 
particularly succinct and clear statement of some of the factors that a 
court may find meaningful in making its determination of good faith” 
(internal quotation omitted)); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 152 
(4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a totality of circumstances test may also 
include consideration of debtor’s pre-petition conduct); Pub. Fin. Corp. 
v. Freeman, 712 F.2d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding the 
bankruptcy court’s finding that a plan proposing no payments to 
unsecured creditors was proposed in good faith); Flygare v. Boulden, 
709 F.2d 1344, 1347 (10th Cir. 1983) (adopting the factors set forth in 
Estus); Kitchens v. Ga. R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 
F.2d 885, 888–89 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that determination of good 
faith required consideration of factors similar to those used in Estus); 
Goeb v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding 
that good faith analysis involving consideration of various factors may 
also include the substantiality of the proposed repayment); Ravenot v. 
Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426, 431–32 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding 
that a fixed 70 percent repayment requirement was unnecessary to 
establish good faith). 
169. See, e.g., State v. Baldoni, 609 A.2d 219 (R.I. 1992) (per curiam) 
(involving a Rhode Island state police officer’s effort to obtain a warrant 
that would authorize a search of the defendant’s residence).  
170. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985) 
(establishing the totality of the circumstances as the proper test for 
foreseeability regarding employer liability).  
171. See, e.g., Stotler & Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 855 
F.2d 1288, 1292 (7th Cir. 1988) (establishing the totality of the 
circumstances as the proper test in determining vicarious liability for 
“soliciting customers to trade commodity futures accounts”). 
172. See, e.g., Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng’g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted) (“Whether an invention is 
on sale is a question of law, and no single finding or conclusion is a sine 
qua non to its resolution. The totality of the circumstances must always 
be considered . . . .”). 
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ment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.173 
This survey of the cases involving totality-of-the-circumstances 
tests shows that courts have fashioned a more flexible test to 
ascertain the existence of consent to protect important interests. Why 
should economic interests be treated differently? Some scholars have 
argued that economic rights should be treated as human rights.174 The 
ultimate, overarching goal of contract law should be fairness in 
economic exchanges. A totality of the circumstances approach would 
be much more suited for this goal than focusing on the elusive search 
for consent of the parties. 
B. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test for Contract Enforcement 
How does a totality-of-the-circumstances test work in contract 
law?175 Instead of searching for an individual’s consent, the test will 
permit the courts to examine multiple factors to determine whether a 
contract should be enforced. As part of the inquiry, consent will 
become a factor of the analysis, not the factor in justifying use of 
state power.  
For example, under this test, a court can ask whether a 
reasonable person under the circumstances would have understood the 
terms of the contract and consented based on a full understanding of 
the terms. The court can also look into the circumstances surrounding 
the negotiations. Was the promisor able to negotiate the terms of the 
agreement? The court can also look at the resources of the parties. 
Did one party have substantially more resources than the other 
party? Was there any manipulation of the information that would 
render it unfair for the court to enforce the contract? What are the 
terms? Are the terms commercially reasonable? Any other practical 
concerns that would render enforcement appropriate? 
A totality-of-circumstances-test is a more honest standard.176 It re-
lieves contract law and courts from the untenable position of having to 
 
173. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hendrick, 503 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1986) (remanding the 
case because the lower court did not assess whether the overcrowding of 
the prison population violated the Eight Amendment based on a 
totality-of-the-circumstances test). 
174. See Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 441, 466 
(1992) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment must be understood as including 
the[ ] positive rights of autonomy, economic self-sufficiency, and political 
self-governance.” (emphasis added)). 
175. Professor Craswell has suggested that a discussion of what counts as 
knowing or voluntary consent should take into consideration the 
institutional competence of the courts to award an appropriate remedy 
if a contract lacks any meaningful consent. Craswell, supra note 156, at 
210, 213. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the 
relationship between institutional competence and consent analysis.  
176. When arguing that consent cannot justify all human experiments, 
Garnett described the reliance on consent as “subterfuge designed to 
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ascertain the existence of a human act as elusive as consent and, when 
inevitably failing to do so, of having to maintain a fiction. Continuing 
the fiction will put the legitimacy of contract law into doubt.177  
Conclusion 
The consent concept may have played a useful role when 
economic relationships were simpler and when there was less 
manipulation in the marketplace.178 But with unprecedented 
manipulation of human decision-making biases, as identified by 
behavioral economists in the last few decades, consent has become 
very elusive and difficult to define and ascertain. Because of those 
difficulties, consent should no longer serve as a justification for the 
government’s exercise of power in favor of one party over the other in 
a contractual relationship. Contract law has so far relied on a 
patchwork of defenses and doctrines to deal with the defects of 
consent, but these efforts do not address the difficult situations caused 
by increasingly sophisticated marketplace manipulations and prac-
tices. If contract law continues its consent focus, it will end up siding 
with the more powerful parties in an economic relationship. One of 
government’s functions is to reduce the scope of exploitation.179 
Contract law’s focus on consent will produce a result in opposition to 
government’s goals. It will further the perception that government is 
putting its thumb on the scale for the rich and the powerful. 
 
hide our unease and to allow us to profess simultaneous commitment to 
values that often conflict.” Garnett, supra note 32, at 460. 
177. One can argue that another way to solve the consent problem is to 
adopt the informed-consent concept. The problem is that the inquiry 
into informed consent gets us mired in some tough factual inquiries. For 
example, when has a person truly consented? Do we go by objective 
manifestations or subjective understanding? What if someone truly 
believes that he consented and acted consistently with the subjective 
consent (think subprime borrowers); does that justify the state’s 
enforcement of consent? What about people who voluntarily agree to be 
slaves? What about people who do not understand the terms of the 
contract? Some scholars suspect that informed consent is often honored 
in the breach and difficult to enforce as a practical matter. Schuck, 
supra note 1, at 932–33 (discussing the informed consent requirement in 
the patient-physician context). 
178. See Stiglitz, supra note 149, at 205 (“The appropriate role of the state 
differs from country to country and from era to era. Twenty-first-
century capitalism is different from nineteenth century capitalism. . . . 
Globalization and new technologies have opened up the possibility of 
new global monopolies with a wealth and power beyond anything that 
the barons of the late nineteenth century could have dreamed.”). 
179. Id. at 204. 
  
 
   
